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Our Brothers’ Keeper:
Moral Witness
Alex Danchev1
Abstract
This article considers the practice of witness in the world—witness to the world—in particular the
character and temper, nature and purpose, significance and resonance of ‘‘moral witness,’’ a kind of
ideal type, as conceived by the philosopher Avishai Margalit. It proposes that the artist plays an
important role as a moral witness and that the work of art itself performs the same function, even
after the fact—the phenomenon of ‘‘postwitness.’’ In this context, it identifies an ethics of precision
or exactitude and adduces a variety of exemplars, ranging from poetry to photography, including
Shot at Dawn (2014), a suite of landscape photographs which are also war photographs and memorial
photographs, and acts of moral witness, by Chloe Dewe Mathews.
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witness
Attestation of a fact, event, or statement; testimony, evidence; evidence given in a court of justice . . .
Applied to the individual testimony of conscience; after 2 Cor[inthians] i. 12 [‘For our rejoicing is this,
the testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity and godly sincerity . . . we have had our conversation
in the world’.] . . .
One who is or was present and is able to testify from personal observation; one present as a spectator or
auditor (cf. eye-witness, ear-witness) . . .
Something that furnishes evidence or proof of the thing or fact mentioned; an evidential mark or sign, a
token . . .
One who testifies for Christ or the Christian faith, esp. by death; a martyr.
Oxford English Dictionary
Witnessing shapes history and memory. Witness testimony is evidence and something more than
evidence. The act of witness is not confined to the laws or the scriptures, though it smacks a little
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of both. All over the world, society is saturated in images and image makers clamoring to bear wit-
ness. What do pictures want?1 To testify!
It is often remarked that artists bear witness. They have done so since the beginning of time. It is
less often remarked that works of art themselves bear witness. The most celebrated example in
recent memory may be Picasso’s Guernica (1937), reproductions of which were worn as a badge
of honor by antiwar protestors on the eve of the Iraq War in 2003: warning and witnessing at the
same time. Another example is Klee’s Angelus Novus (1920)—Walter Benjamin’s ‘‘angel of his-
tory’’—a survivor who bears witness to the terrible twentieth century. Ironically, when it comes
to witnessing, the testimony of the author of the act is not always to be trusted. Artists and other
makers of graven images are rarely explicit or programmatic; often they obfuscate their purpose.
Occasionally, someone makes a statement. The mottos of Goya’s Disasters of War (1810–1820) are
legendary: ‘‘One cannot look at this.’’ ‘‘I saw it.’’ ‘‘This is the truth.’’ In the Western canon, or the
Western way of witness, Goya is the gold standard. He testifies from personal observation, as pre-
scribed. His testimony is to all intents and purposes irrefutable; it is etched in the cultural memory of
an entire continent. Goya is Paul Celan’s Breathcrystal,
your unannullable
witness.2
Every war artist who came after him, every war photographer in particular, has Goya on his
shoulder. Don McCullin, one of the best of them, made those mottos his own. In his autobiography,
he recalls coming on a father and two sons lying in a pool of their own blood in a stone house in
Cyprus during the conflict of the 1960s. He is riveted by the scene, as much for the tableau as the
tragedy. It is as if he had been called upon to act, that is to say, to witness. McCullin is an ethical
professional, with an active conscience. Still rooted to the spot when the rest of the family return, he
is suddenly conscious of trespassing with his camera. But the survivors are content for him to do
what he has to do. ‘‘When I realized I had been given the go-ahead to photograph,’’ he writes, ‘‘I
started composing my pictures in a very serious and dignified way. It was the first time that I had
pictured something of this immense significance and I felt as if I had a canvas in front of me and
I was, stroke by stroke, applying the composition to a story I was telling myself. I was, I realized
later, trying to photograph in a way that Goya painted or did his war sketches.’’3
McCullin’s counterpart James Nachtwey is perhaps the most exacting ethical professional in the
business. He is remorseless. At the beginning of his signature collection, Inferno (1999), he quotes
Dante: ‘‘Through me is the way to join the lost people.’’ Nachtwey has been to hell on our behalf; he
is intimately familiar with the place, all nine circles of it. He keeps going back to tell the tale—to
bear witness—whether we like it or not. ‘‘Nachtwey’s photographs are an odd, compelling combi-
nation of misery and serenity, of horrible content and stylized form,’’ observes Susie Linfield. ‘‘But
the perfection of their compositions—their so-called beauty—should not deflect us: Nachtwey’s
photographs are brutal, and they show us more than we can bear. But not more than we need to
see.’’4
There are many ways of witnessing and a degree of fuzziness to much of the thinking about it.
Despite a vast outpouring of historical studies, cultural studies, memory studies, and even philoso-
phical studies, it remains a rather elusive subject, as to the basics of who, and when, and how, and
why, and larger questions of equal pertinence: to what end and to what effect? Part of the problem
may be its excess baggage—juridical, ethical, and even spiritual—as the Oxford English Dictionary
serves to reveal. ‘‘Applied to the individual testimony of conscience,’’ it records, citing the magni-
ficent formulation from the Book of Corinthians, ‘‘we have had our conversation in the world.’’ Wit-
nessing may not change the world but having that conversation marks it, tempers it, and occasionally
192 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 40(3-4)
 at University of St Andrews on March 28, 2016alt.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
rubs it red raw. The act of witnessing is not a neutral act. It does not leave things as the witness finds
them. It does not spare feelings. The witness spares nothing and nobody, not even the witness. That
is the idea—to prick the conscience, to lodge in the memory, or to stick in the throat. Here is where
art finds its place. ‘‘Art as freedom from moral narrowness and corner-perspectives,’’ as Nietzsche
says, ‘‘or as mockery of them.’’5 In this sense, the witness is more akin to an agitator than a bystan-
der, but also more purposive, more principled, and more pure. If the bystander is a deeply compro-
mised figure, the witness is a profoundly elevated one. Put differently, the witness is an historical
agent with a moral purpose and a militant faith, in Avishai Margalit’s words, ‘‘that in another place
or another time there exists, or will exist, a moral community that will listen to their testimony.’’6
Margalit’s exposition of the ‘‘moral witness’’ is a scrupulous and suggestive treatment, deserv-
edly influential. His moral witness has a lot to live up to, however, being at once special case and
ideal type. Margalit applies strict criteria for admission to this select company. The only ones who
qualify are those who have direct, personal experience of radical evil and its consequences, those
who have ‘‘knowledge-by-acquaintance of suffering,’’ as he puts it.7 The paradigm case is probably
a survivor of the camps, like Primo Levi or Elie Wiesel, or the Terror and the Gulag (Vasily Grossman
and Alexsandr Solzenhitsyn), or prolonged torture (Henri Alleg and Jean Ame´ry).8 Somewhat
weaker cases might include those with knowledge by acquaintance of systemic persecution and
incarceration in the Eastern Bloc in its Cold War heyday (Va´clav Havel and Adam Michnik),
or the multiple degradations of military dictatorships (Ariel Dorfman and Wole Soyinka), or—
bringing it all back home—Guanta´namo (Moazzam Begg and Mohamedou Ould Slahi).9 Aston-
ishingly, Slahi wrote 122,000 words of his Guanta´namo diary in a single-cell segregation hut in
Camp Echo, in 2005, after he had been put through a ‘‘special interrogation plan’’ personally
approved by Donald Rumsfeld. The diary was published ten years later, after a long legal battle.
The author remained in captivity, but his book was free at last—though heavily redacted. Slahi’s
account is untutored and surprisingly measured; often decoded by sympathetic editing, the redac-
tions function as a kind of silent reinforcement. On one occasion, as the special interrogation plan
is in full swing, he is undone by a kind word:
‘‘How you been?’’ said one of the Puerto Rican escorting guards in his weak English.
‘‘I’m OK, thanks, and you?’’
‘‘No worry, you gonna back to your family,’’ he said. When he said that I couldn’t help breaking in
[redacted].10
We supply the tears.
Slahi is insistent on only one thing: he must make himself heard. He must testify. ‘‘Please,’’ he
tells his administrative review board, ‘‘I want you guys to understand my story okay, because it
really doesn’t matter if they release me or not, I just want my story understood.’’11 As a witness,
he has a conspicuous virtue: he is eminently capable of imagining a moral community that will listen
to his testimony. He addresses that community in his summing up:
I don’t even know how to treat this subject. I have only written what I experienced, what I saw, and what I
learned first-hand. I have tried not to exaggerate, nor to understate. I have tried to be as fair as possible, to
the US government, to my brothers, and to myself. I don’t expect people who don’t know me to believe
me, but I expect them, at least, to give me the benefit of the doubt. And if Americans are willing to stand
for what they believe in, I also expect public opinion to compel the US government to open a torture and
war crimes investigation. I am more than confident that I can prove every single thing I have written in
this book if I am ever given the opportunity to call witnesses in a proper judicial procedure, and if
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military personnel are not given the advantage of straightening their lies and destroying evidence against
them.12
The moral witness may be memorized and memorialized. The greatest poetic witness of the terror
was the majestic Anna Akhmatova: the one who meant most to her country and culture; the one who
kept the word, ‘‘the great Russian word,’’ alive for them; the one who outlasted her persecutors—
who so exasperated them, she said, that they all died of heart attacks before her. Requiem, the
sequence of poems she composed during the late 1930s but did not commit to paper, is reported
to have survived only in the memories of the poet and a few of her most trusted friends: her own
moral community. ‘‘Eleven people knew Requiem by heart,’’ she recalled, ‘‘and not one of them
betrayed me.’’ It was first published in 1963, ‘‘without the author’s knowledge or consent,’’ by the
Society of Russian E´migre´ Writers, from a copy which had found its way to the West. It was pre-
faced by a brief note dated April 1957. The note itself became a legend:
In the fearful years of the Yezhov terror I spent seventeen months in prison queues in Leningrad. One day
somebody ‘‘identified’’ me. Beside me, in the queue, there was a woman with blue lips. She had, of
course, never heard of me; but she suddenly came out of that trance so common to us all and whispered
in my ear (everybody spoke in whispers there): ‘‘Can you describe this?’’ And I said: ‘‘Yes, I can.’’ And
then something like the shadow of a smile crossed what had once been her face.13
For Margalit, moral witnesses of this ilk are insiders rather than outsiders; they are inside the story
they have to tell, unlike photographers or filmmakers or reporters, concerned or unconcerned,
embedded or unembedded. They are ‘‘special agents of collective memory,’’ promoting ‘‘thick iden-
tity’’ based upon ‘‘thick relations,’’ that is to say a felt sense of shared ties, human, and cosmopo-
litan. Their moral standing is assured, not only by their fortitude but also by their resolve—the moral
witness deliberately accepts the personal risk.
No one
bears witness for the
witness.14
The notion of the moral witness is a compelling one. Undaunted by the excess baggage, it succeeds
in capturing the ethical impulsion that is fundamental to the very idea of witnessing. The act of wit-
ness is linked axiomatically to the exercise of conscience. The moral witness is a kind of conscien-
tious objector. But is she alone in that? TheMargalit model of moral witness is persuasive enough, as
far as it goes, but it appears to impose certain limitations on the subject, in particular, as to who and
when and how.
The thrust of the argument about insider and outsider is surely right—witnessing is not a spectator
sport and witness tourism is no more palatable than war tourism—but the distinction is not so simple
to maintain. During the occupation, for example, the artist Jean Fautrier moved in Resistance circles
in Paris; his studio was a rendezvous. In 1943, he was arrested by the Gestapo and briefly impri-
soned. After his release, he went into hiding in a sanatorium on the outskirts of the city, where
he began work on a series of abstract, headlike forms called Hostages (1943–1945), a response to
the sounds he could hear from his window: the screams of torture and the shots of executions. Fau-
trier was an earwitness. Ostensibly, he had nothing to say—he was famously closemouthed—but
‘‘Fautrier l’enrage´,’’ as Jean Paulhan called him, was impelled to act. ‘‘One can’t be painting apples
while heads are rolling,’’ he declared.15 His testimony, in his own idiom, was as searing as any. The
Hostages were exhibited in 1945, immediately after the Liberation; they achieved mythic status.16
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They testified eloquently to man’s inhumanity to man. At the same time, they were an attestation of
human dignity, claimed by Andre´ Malraux as ‘‘the most beautiful monument to the dead of the Sec-
ond World War.’’17 They were also an affront, an outrage. The hostages demanded a response—an
ethical response. ‘‘How should we respond when confronted with the idea of the Hostages?’’ asked
Francis Ponge. ‘‘One might say that here is one of the fundamental questions of our time.’’18
Fautrier was an insider of a kind. So, too, is Sebastia˜o Salgado, the photographer of famine in the
Sahel and other battles in other wars. As Eduardo Galeano underlined in a brilliant appreciation,
‘‘Salgado photographs people. Casual photographers photograph phantoms.’’
As an article of consumption, poverty is a source of morbid pleasure and much money. Poverty is a com-
modity that fetches a high price on the luxury market. Consumer-society photographers approach but do
not enter. In hurried visits to scenes of despair or violence, they climb out of the plane or helicopter, press
the shutter release, explode the flash: they shoot and run. They have looked without seeing and their
images say nothing. Their cowardly photographs soiled with horror or blood may extract a few crocodile
tears, a few coins, a pious word or two from the privileged of the earth, none of which changes the order
of their universe. At the sight of the dark-skinned wretched, forsaken by God and pissed on by dogs, any-
body who is nobody confidentially congratulates himself: life hasn’t done too badly by me, in compar-
ison. Hell serves to confirm the virtues of paradise.
Charity, vertical, humiliates. Solidarity, horizontal, helps. Salgado photographs from inside, from
solidarity.19
Salgado’s works of witness are humanitarian interventions. They are ethical and, inescapably, polit-
ical. ‘‘Like all politically effective images,’’ argues David Levi Strauss, ‘‘the best of Salgado’s
photographs work in the fissures, the wounds, of the social. They cause those who see them to ask
themselves: Are we allowed to view what is being exposed?’’20 This is the path to thick relations, the
hallmark of moral witness, and the signature of the master photographer. ‘‘It allows his subjects to be
themselves and more than themselves at once.’’21
Witnessing (moral or otherwise) may be done after the fact. Paradoxical as it may seem, the act of
witness need not be instantaneous or contemporaneous. Robert Capa’s celebrated dictum, ‘‘If your
pictures aren’t good enough, you’re not close enough,’’ does not apply, if the burden of that dictum is
to prescribe a kind of action shot, a close-up in the moment. Unquestionably, ‘‘I was there’’ can
deliver a visceral charge. Capa’s D-Day landings are sufficient proof of that; and McCullin’s
shell-shocked soldier returns to haunt us at regular intervals. But powerful witnessing happens after
the battle—after the war—sometimes long after. Simon Baker has noted ‘‘the capacity of photogra-
phy to bear witness even (or especially) at removes of several decades.’’22
This form of witness we might call postwitness, by analogy with ‘‘postmemory,’’ the term pro-
posed by Marianne Hirsch to comprehend the folk memory (or family memory) of successor gen-
erations, whose connection to the original event or source is not through recollection, as she says,
but through ‘‘imaginative investment and creation.’’23 Postwitness is exemplified in a recent project,
which is also an anniversary project, by Chloe Dewe Mathews (born 1982), Shot at Dawn (2014).24
Arresting alike in its clarity and its humanity, Shot at Dawn is not immediately recognizable as an
act of witness or indeed as a morally cogent act at all. It is at first sight a suite of landscape photo-
graphs: bucolic scenes, for the most part: a path beaten through a field; a snow-covered wood; and
a stream. They are plainly titled, as if marked on the map: ‘‘Vane´mont, Vosges, Lorraine;’’
‘‘Verbranden-Molen, West-Vlaanderen;’’ ‘‘Klijtebeek stream, Dikkebus, Ieper’’ (Ypres or
‘‘Wipers’’ to the Tommies who had the misfortune to fetch up there). They are big—big enough
for the viewer to lose himself, or his bearings, but not his moral compass. These are the sites at
which British, French, and Belgian soldiers were executed for cowardice and desertion during the
Great War.
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The complete series comprises twenty-three photographs, of which a sample may be inspected in
various exhibitions. Inspection is invited, or incited, by a gnawing awareness of their backstory—the
slow realization of their slow realization—and by the deadpan data accompanying each one.
At Vane´mont:
time 06:30/date 07.09.1914
Soldat EUGE`NE BOURET Soldat FRANCISQUE JEAN AIME´ DUCARRE Soldat ERNEST
FRANC¸OIS MACKEN Soldat BENOIˆT MANILLIER Soldat FRANCISQUE PITIOT Soldat
CLAUDIUS URBAIN
time 07:45/date 12.09.1914
Soldat JULES BERGER Soldat GILBERT GATHIER Soldat FERNAND LOUIS INCLAIR
At Verbranden-Molen:
time 17:00/date 15.12.1914
Soldat ALI BEN AHMED BEN FREJ BEN KHELIL Soldat HASSEN BEN ALI BEN GUERRA
EL AMOLANI Soldat AHMED BEN MOHAMMED EL YADJIZY Soldat MOHAMMED
OULD MOHAMMED BEN AHMED
At Klijtbeek:
time 05:50/date 10.04.1918
Private HENRY HUGHES
In an era of the ‘‘global war on terror,’’ the naming itself is an act of witness. Shot at Dawn, it
transpires, is a resurrection—not a body snatching but a revisiting, an investigation of the record,
and an invitation to think again.
The record was deliberately concealed for a long period; the story remained untold until very
recently. In 2006, the Ministry of Defence announced that 306 soldiers convicted of desertion in the
face of the enemy and executed during the Great War were to be posthumously pardoned. Each of
the countries immediately involved is wrestling with its own painful history, though in each case the
brutality of summary justice was leavened with a certain residual compassion (or caution). In
Britain, the vast majority of those sentenced to death were pardoned at the time; of over 3,000 con-
victions for capital offences, 346 were carried out. In Belgium, the proportions were somewhat
similar: of 220 convictions, 18 were carried out. In France, of 412 convictions during a summer
of mutinies in 1917, 55 were carried out. The names, dates, and times of these executions appear
in courts-martial proceedings. The locations, however, are difficult to establish with precision. Dewe
Mathews is the first person to explore them systematically, camera at the ready.
Shot at Dawn is a documentary project, first and foremost, but there is more to it than that. The
photographs bear witness, one hundred years after the event. Like her distinguished forebears, Dewe
Mathews is not merely a shutter operator but a thinker photographer. ‘‘These places have been
altered by a traumatic event,’’ she reflects. ‘‘By photographing them, I am reinserting the individual
into that space, stamping their presence back onto the land, so that their histories are not forgot-
ten.’’25 Every photograph is a certificate of presence, as Roland Barthes pointed out. Fundamentally,
this is a moral position. Dewe Mathews is a moral witness. Shot at Dawn is excavatory, testamen-
tary, and perhaps even reparatory. In every sense, the plot is subject to scrutiny. Those bucolic
scenes, soaked in meaning, are sites of memory, certainly, but also sites of self-examination, for
spectators of all sorts. In the final analysis, these photographs are little histories of conscience—a
centenary of conscience—inventories of its excitation and reinterpretation over time.
They are also examples of exactitude: an ethical attribute.26 Witnessing imposes its own exacting
requirements. For Paul Celan, it was the date—he urged ‘‘a concentration that remains mindful of all
our dates.’’27 In the case of Shot at Dawn, an approximate location or an approximate time of day
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would nullify the core concept. Shot at Dawn is the very opposite of shoot and run. Similarly, for
Simon Norfolk, a photographer who follows the wars and the massacres, inspecting the ground and
the guilty secrets sown there, precise knowledge of the gravesites and the killing fields is of vital
importance, for the credibility of the work and the veracity of the witness.28 As Mr Cogito knew,
in these matters, accuracy is necessary. From ‘‘Mr Cogito on the Need for Precision,’’ in Zbigniew
Herbert’s Report from a Besieged City (1983), which is among other things a witnessing of Warsaw
under martial law:
a spectre is haunting
the map of history
the spectre of indeterminacy
. . .
we count the survivors
and an unknown remainder
neither known to be alive
nor definitively deceased
are given the bizarre name
of the lost
. . .
how hard to establish the names
of all those who were lost
battling against inhuman power
the official data
diminish their number
once again mercilessly
decimating the fallen
. . .
eyewitnesses
blinded by gas
deafened by gun salvos
by fear and despair
are inclined to exaggerate
. . .
but in these matters
accuracy is necessary
one can’t get it wrong
even in a single case
in spite of everything
we are our brothers’ keepers
ignorance about those who are lost
undermines the reality of the world29
The work of witness stands against indeterminacy and ignorance. ‘‘An evidential mark or sign’’
offers theOED, ‘‘a token.’’ On the battlefields of the Great War, the lost are still missing. The Thiep-
val Memorial to the Missing of the Somme (1928–1932) is one such sign, inscribed with the names
of the 72,195 officers and men who died there between 1915 and 1918, who have no known grave.
Memorials, too, bear witness. Lost and found, we have need of this token. Witnessing does not right
wrongs; it makes possible their reappraisal.
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Witnesses seem to whisper among themselves. ‘‘I should have liked to call you all by name,’’
recorded Akhmatova in Requiem, ‘‘but they have lost the lists.’’ Ingeborg Bachmann salutes Anna
Akhmatova:
To create a single lasting sentence,
to persevere in the ding-dong of words.
No one writes this sentence
who does not sign her name.30
Zbigniew Herbert salutes Jean Ame´ry:
The torturers sleep soundly their dreams are rosy
good-natured genocides—foreign and home-grown
already forgiven by brief human memory31
Witnessing is intimately bound up with suffering. Loss is the common currency. ‘‘And so they are
ever returning to us, the dead,’’ as W. G. Sebald reminds us.32 Bearing witness is good, it appears,
but on occasion it is too much. After 9/11, public witness to the ‘‘jumpers’’ from the World Trade
Center was disallowed, and the photograph of the famous ‘‘falling man’’ effectively suppressed; the
deaths are recorded as homicide due to blunt trauma. Suicide (on our side) is indeed more than we
can bear. The reality of the world is difficult to stomach. ‘‘We cannot bear reality,’’ muses David
Levi Strauss, ‘‘but we bear images—like stigmata, like children, like fallen comrades. We suffer
them. We idealize them. We believe them because we need what we are in them.’’33 Sometimes,
we refuse them. Yet they have a way of getting under our skin. In the preamble to the remarkable
work of witness to the lives of the poor sharecroppers of Alabama in the Great Depression, Let Us
Now Praise Famous Men (1941), in collaboration with the photographer Walker Evans, the writer
James Agee poses a series of unforgettable questions. ‘‘Who are you who will read these words and
study these photographs, and through what cause, by what chance, and for what purpose, and by
what right do you qualify to, and what will you do about it?’’34
Every act of witness asks the same.
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